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Abstract 
This article explores a micro-lending platform linking investors mostly located in developed 
countries and micro-entrepreneurs located in Africa. At the heart of this social and economic 
innovation is the online auction model, a concept that has been intensively investigated and used 
in developed countries. However, little knowledge exists about how these new models are used 
and implemented in developing countries, and about how existing theories are able to explain 
such an emerging innovative phenomenon. The article makes two main contributions. First, it 
applies a theoretical pluralist approach to further improve our understanding of MYC4, an online 
auction model for micro-lending purposes being applied in Africa and selected as our case study. 
Secondly, it uses the understanding produced from data analysis of MYC4 to validate 
propositions derived from three theoretical approaches. Our analysis shows that the three 
theoretical approaches differ in their basic assumptions – critical dimensions – and in the 
usefulness of their propositions, two of them being more valuable than the third one for drawing 
up guidelines for designing and implementing online auction markets and for identifying 
implications regarding the role of information, technology and the stakeholders involved. 
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1. Introduction 
Microcredit has been considered a powerful instrument to fight poverty and to create income 
opportunities for low-income populations, particularly in developing countries (Diniz et al. 
2009). In the near future, microcredit is expected to move up from NGO-related (Non-
Governmental Organizations) traditional operations to the mainstream of the financial markets 
(Diniz and Pozzebon 2010). This provides the opportunity to introduce and create new business 
models for microfinance and microcredit operations, such as: peer-to-peer markets, 
crowdfunding, and innovative auction markets. Enabled by web technologies, direct linkages 
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might be built between low-income borrowers, often located in developing countries, and lenders 
in developed regions (Robinson 2001). Each time a deal is made, it results in investments in 
business activities in poor regions of the world, which might stimulate local development and 
economic growth, and attract further investments.  
Despite the optimistic perspective that this move from non-profit to for-profit markets might 
trigger in certain promoters of inclusive finance, we should be aware of the inherent risks. Any 
initiative regarding poverty reduction should be taken seriously and with social responsibility. 
We cannot ignore the advantages that new technologies might bring to less developed regions, 
but we cannot be naïve thinking that the use of those new technologies are necessarily beneficial 
to all parties. Financial and technological sectors have been for decades putting forward the idea 
that Western mechanisms might foster development, but an important number of projects’ results 
show the opposite (Pozzebon and Van Heck, 2006). Likewise, the area of ICT4D (information 
and communication technology for development) has shown that any unidirectional or purely 
instrumental attempt to “transfer” technologies from developed to less developed countries might 
be detrimental to the later if a true appropriation process does not take place (Avgerou, 2003).  
This been said, we believe that online models that put borrowers and lenders directly in contact, 
eliminating onerous intermediaries, might be advantageous for both sides. However, from both an 
academic and practice perspective, there is a lack of knowledge about how online models are 
designed, implemented and used in emerging economies, and about how existing theories 
(usually developed in developed countries) are able to explain such a radical innovative 
phenomenon in emerging economies.  
This article has two objectives. The first is to review academic literature on online markets, 
particularly online auction markets, to provide an overview and synthesis of leading theoretical 
approaches. These reviewed lenses are then deployed to produce a better understanding of one 
specific case of an online auction model being applied to micro-lending in developing countries 
in Africa. The second objective is to benefit from a deep understanding of such a specific case of 
the online auction market to validate a number of propositions drawn from the selected 
theoretical approaches. In brief, in our paper the connection between theory and empirical case is 
bi-directional: theory helping to understand empirics and empirics to validate theory. 
The online auction model selected as our case study is known as MYC4
1
. Established in 2006, 
MYC4 is headquartered in Copenhagen and operates with around 30 employees through a 
business network of around 28 local providers and local lenders in Africa. The main contribution 
of our work is to investigate online auction markets through different theoretical lenses, trying to 
produce knowledge on how to improve conditions for successful micro-lending models and 
thereby increasing knowledge for financial and social inclusion and for organizing alternatives in 
emerging economies. 
 
2. Three Theoretical Approaches  
From the review of literature on online auction models, we identified three leading research 
streams that portray those markets as: (1) allocation practices, (2) definitional practices, and (3) 
                                                 
1
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informational practices. These three theoretical approaches were chosen for the following 
reasons: 
1. Each theoretical approach has potential explanatory power e.g. will be able to explain the 
design of (online) auctions; 
2. The theoretical approaches are grounded in Western thinking but not much validated in a 
non-Western context; 
3. The theoretical approaches have different backgrounds e.g. the first one is economic 
oriented, the second one is sociological oriented, and the third approach is information 
systems oriented.  
 
2.1 Auction Markets as Allocation Practices  
From an economic perspective, auction markets are seen as allocation practices. The auction 
market is allocating the best buyers to the best sellers, or reverse in case of reverse auctions, and 
the value of the product or service is only reflected by the price of the product or service. The 
starting point is the groundbreaking 1961 article of Vickrey (Nobel Prize in economics in 1996). 
Vickrey (1961) designed a new type of auction: the so-called Vickrey auction. Bidders are 
placing bids; the winner is the one who offered the highest price, but the price that is paid by the 
highest bidder is the second highest bid ("second-price sealed bid auction"). Although this type of 
auction model was rarely used in the past (Rothkopf et al. 1990), recently, online auctions such as 
Overture and Google started to use it. In the period after the publication of the Vickrey article, a 
lot of research on auctions was carried out in micro-economics (e.g., Milgrom 1989; Klemperer 
2002).  
2.2 Auction Markets as Definitional Practices  
A very different lens is the sociological perspective on auction markets, wherein markets are 
viewed as definitional practices. Smith (1989) is the first one who has been investigating an 
auction from a sociological perspective. Based on close participation and observations in all 
kinds of auctions (art auctions, fish auctions, livestock auctions), he concludes: “Auctions do 
many things: They resolve ambiguities and uncertainties; they establish the value, identity, and 
ownership of items; they entertain; they shape social relationships; and they reallocate vast sums 
of money. They also tell us a great deal about economic life and social behavior. It is in this latter 
capacity, as a paradigm of human behavior, that they have had their greatest impact not only on 
how we think about the determinants of economic value and behavior but rational behavior in 
general” (Smith 1989:162). In a more recent article, Smith extended his results into a more 
detailed theory that was examined with two emerging online auction markets: the sponsored 
word/phrase Internet search engine markets and the equity option markets. Four propositions are 
central in his theory (Smith 2007:3): (1) Market practices are embedded in social meanings and 
generate social meanings; (2) The production/reproduction of market meanings is grounded in the 
interactive social practices of “taking the role of other” and mutual understanding; (3) Markets 
are evolving practice subject not only to changing external factors but also internal changes due 
to their own definitional practices; (4) Market ideations affect non-market practices as well as 
market practices insofar as market generated meanings and framings spill over into non-market 
practices. The four claims are illustrated by two ethnographic studies of two emerging markets 
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(Smith 2007).The social structure of auction markets has also been investigated by many other 
researchers (Baker 1984; Uzzi 1997). 
2.3 Auction Markets as Informational Practices  
In the third approach, located in management studies, auction markets are seen as information 
aggregation tools and considered as informational practices. The research on auctions starts from 
the practical situation and practical problems and thus is critical about economic research. An 
example of a critical analysis is the article of Rothkopf and Harstad (1994:381). They state: 
"However, in our view, bidding theory is still playing “catch up” in the sense that there are 
phenomena that experienced, thoughtful auction participants are aware of that are not well 
reflected in its models. Until the catching up is completed, the role of the theory in practical 
auction design will be limited". In brief, in their analysis economic auction theory has limited 
value in practice. There are several discussions in this approach dealing with online auction 
markets and the role of information systems and technology (Koppius 2002; Kambil and Van 
Heck 2002). In Table 1, we provide a number of propositions derived from the analysis of the 
three theoretical lenses. We believe that these propositions represent organizing mechanisms that 
might, in concrete situations, guide design and adjustments of online auction models. More 
importantly, we suggest that those propositions could be useful in the improvement of 
microlending auction models.  
 
 
Table 1. Propositions of Three Theoretical Lenses. 
 
Auction Markets  
as Allocation 
Practices 
Auction Markets  
as Definitional 
Practices 
Auction Markets  
as Informational 
Practices 
Propositions 
derived from 
theories 
P1a: The choice of the 
auction model needs to be 
close to Vickrey’s model 
and will generate the best 
allocative efficiency and 
Pareto optimality. 
P1b: Rational bidding leads 
to the best outcome for 
individual bidders.  
P1c: Extremely asymmetric 
information and signaling 
will have a negative impact 
on the outcome of the 
auction market. 
P2a: Online auction 
market practices are 
embedded in social 
meaning and generate 
social meanings. 
P2b: Online auction 
markets are evolving 
practices subject to 
external factors and 
internal changes. 
P2c: Online auction 
markets are influenced by 
external practices and in 
turn influence them. 
P3a: Online auction market 
must create value for all the 
participants involved. 
P3b: Richer information 
architecture (with more 
information feedback over a 
longer period of time) will 
lead to a better auction 
market outcome. 
P3c: Online auction markets 
that are designed around 
human interactions 
supported by technology in a 
social context will survive 
over time. 
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2.4 Comparing the Three Research Lenses  
The careful analysis of these three theoretical approaches allowed us to recognize a number of 
critical dimensions that help to understand similarities and differences between them. In Table 2, 
we provide a summary of the critical dimensions of the three research lenses. 
 
 
Table 2. Overview of the Three Theoretical Lenses.  
 Auction Markets as 
Allocation Practices 
Auction Markets as 
Definitional 
Practices 
Auction Markets as 
Informational Practices 
Context  Context is not considered. Context is very important 
and it encompasses the 
mutual interaction of the 
auction market with the 
outside world. 
Context is considered in terms 
of buyer and seller 
characteristics. 
Participants’ 
roles  and 
Processes 
Bidders behave in a 
rational way.  Interaction 
among different bidding 
strategies is a key 
component of the bidding 
process. 
Individuals are socially 
characterized and 
embedded in social 
meaning systems. 
Interactive social practices 
of “taking the role of the 
other” and mutual 
understanding.  
Stakeholders are “bounded’ 
rational. Market processes (such 
as search, pricing, logistics etc.) 
among different stakeholders. 
Information exchange among 
processes and feedback are 
important components.  
Outcomes Price and allocation are the 
main outcome parameters. 
Value is mostly one-
dimensional (price). 
Outcomes are based on 
allocative efficiency and 
Pareto optimality. 
Meanings/rules and 
allocations. Meaning/rules 
that determine the 
parameters of the goods.  
Price, allocation, and 
information are the main 
outcome parameters. Value is 
considered multi-dimensional 
(price, quality, delivery time, 
etc.).  
Role of 
technology 
Asymmetric information 
among bidders 
(private/public 
information) is an 
important determinant for 
market outcome but 
information is not related 
to its context. Information 
technology is not 
considered to play an 
important role. 
Information as element of 
social interaction, 
meaning, rules. 
Information technology 
interacts with the auction 
market and information 
technology itself is the 
outcome of social 
interaction. 
Information architecture is key 
determinant in explaining 
stakeholder decisions, behavior, 
and outcome of the market. 
Information is sometimes 
related to context. Information 
technology is seen as an 
important enabler of the online 
auction market. 
 
The first stream is grounded in the micro-economics-based auction theory. The outcome of the 
auction market is based on the bidding strategies of the participating bidders, the private and 
public available information, and the type of auction used. The second research stream builds on 
the field of sociology and is developing into a theory of markets as definitional practices. The key 
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element in this theory is the social construction of value of the auctioned products or services. 
The third research stream is about an emerging stream in the information systems field built on 
information processing models, transaction costs theory, and agent and social exchange theory. 
The outcome of the auction market is the result of a complex information exchanging and 
aggregation process among buyers and sellers. The quality of information is a key factor that is a 
crucial component of the information architecture.  
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Single Case Study 
The empirical design was based in a single case study: the online auction model for microlending 
called MYC4. Based on the terminology of Stake (1995), MYC4 can be seen as both an intrinsic 
and an instrumental case study: intrinsic because draws attention by its particular features, 
described later, and itself represents a rich object of investigation; instrumental because MYC4 
helps to develop a better understanding of online auction models and to validate three theoretical 
approaches. This use of three theoretical lenses in a case study design was inspired by the well 
known study published by Lynne Markus (1983) comparing three resistance theories for the 
implementation of management information systems.  
The selection of MYC4 as our case study was guided by two main criteria. First, the combination 
of auction mechanisms with an online platform resulted in a dynamic and interactive model, an 
innovation, whose implications in the long run are still poorly known. The second was the 
opportunity to investigate in real time an emergent online auction market in the micro-
finance/micro-lending industry. MYC4 is one of the few markets in micro-finance that is using an 
advanced auction format and therefore almost unique in its business model. MYC4 is open for 
analysis by researchers. 
Empirical data was collected by two main methods: analysis of online documents (reports, blogs, 
chats and other material) and online participant observation (real time participation in the online 
auction market and in the forum of discussions). One of the researchers observed and interacted 
on a very frequent (sometimes daily) basis in the MYC4 web-based case study from June 2009 
until December 2012. The researcher carried out observations of running auctions and bidding 
processes and also participated actively in trading in the online auction market. This role might 
be seen as observer-as-participant, i.e., the researchers assumes the role of an observer through 
social interaction with the informants but the intent is not interfere or to develop into a 
relationship with the other participants (Nørskov and Rask, 2011). Because the intent is to learn, 
it implies more observation than participation, although a minimal level of participation is a 
condition for performing the observation. In online observations, the “observational data are 
equivalent to the recorded data, since the social interaction and behaviors exist in a written form. 
Consequently, data are easily separated from interpretation, which is rarely the case in offline 
observations. This is likely to have a positive impact on dependability in online observation 
making” (Nørskov and Rask, 2011). Although other dimensions might have a negative impact on 
the accuracy of data and interpretation, online observations can be always complemented with 
offline data, each contributing with different aspects and providing different levels of details.  
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The data collection included participation in the market, reviewing forum discussions, analyzing 
reports, blogs, and other secondary material. The absence of primary data gathered from 
interviews was not a limitation of our research design, due to the richness of the data collected 
from the two main strategies: documents and online observations.  
3.2 The Online Marketplace MYC4 
MYC4 is an online marketplace that connects investors directly with African entrepreneurs, who 
lack capital to develop their business (Bahra 2008). The core of the online marketplace is a 
reverse auction concept. The target of MYC4 is “to be a significant tool in reaching the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals”. These UN Goals were set for 2015 and the counter on 
the web site of MYC4 is counting to 2015 (United Nations 2009).  As of December 2012, a total 
of 19,445 investors from 117 countries had invested €18,028,531 in 11,582 businesses in 7 
African countries. The average interest rate for investors is 13.1% p.a. before defaults and 
currency loss or gain (MYC4 2009). The minimum investment for an investor is €5. MYC4 has a 
business network of sixteen local providers and twelve local lenders in Africa. The local 
providers (that sometimes can be also lenders) select healthy businesses with a need for capital. 
Examples are Growth Africa Capital in Kenya, Birima in Senegal, Premier Resource Consulting 
(PRC) in Ghana. The local lenders handle the financial transactions: contracts, disbursements and 
repayments. Examples of local lenders are Tujijenge in Tanzania, Ivoir Credit in Cote D'ivoire, 
and Capital Micro Credit (CMC) in Uganda.The business model of MYC4 is based on transaction 
fees. MYC4 uses a reverse auction with many bidders (that are the potential investors into the 
auctioned loan. There are many bids and the combination of the lowest bids (by one or many 
bidders) that is able to fulfill the demand (in this case the total loan) will be the winners of the 
auction.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Using the Three Lenses to Build a Better Understanding of MYC4  
The analysis of MYC4 through three theoretical lenses allowed us to produce a number of results. 
It is clear that the MYC4 is a loan auction using an innovative online business model. Value is 
constructed by auctioning of investment proposals and a combination of investors (the one with 
the lowest bid in terms of interest rates) will be able to invest in the loan. In terms of allocation 
MYC4 is doing an excellent job. On average 93% of the loans will get funded (Chemin and de 
Laat 2009). This percentage is much higher than other online markets such as Prosper.com. It 
seems to indicate that investors have a sufficient level of trust in the proposed business proposals 
and the African entrepreneurs. It also indicates that working with local providers and lenders that 
are reviewing the business plans of the potential borrowers seems to work.  
The microfinance element (possibility of making quite small loans) is a strong characteristic in 
MYC4 due to the fact that people can bid for €5 or higher. Given the setup of the auction, many 
investors combine their investment offers to fulfill a loan. For example, in one auction event the 
loan of €1600 could be provided by 30 investors, ranging from €5 to €500. Together, this group 
of 30 investors is taking care of the requested loan.  
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Table 3 provides the results of the first part of our analysis, i.e., the application of the critical 
dimensions of the three research approaches in order to make sense and produce a deeper 
understanding of the empirical case MYC4.   
 
Table 3. Applying the three theoretical lenses to understand MYC4 
 Auction Markets as 
Allocation Practices 
Auction Markets as 
Definitional 
Practices 
Auction Markets as 
Informational 
Practices 
Context Context is not taken into 
account.  
Context is fully is taken 
into account as mutual 
interaction.  
Context is partially taken 
into account.  
Participants’ 
Roles and 
Processes  
Dutch auction model close 
to advantages of Vickrey 
auction.  
Charity bidders do not bid 
in a rational way.  
Interaction among 
investment bidders and 
charity bidders not taken 
into account.  
Interaction between forum 
and auction market 
improves “taking the role 
of the other” (investor) and 
mutual understanding.  
Difference among investor 
bidders and charity bidders 
is taken into account.  
Social meaning by bidders 
(outcome, interaction,  
embedded in social 
meaning systems; 
Changing rules of 
participation governance 
are envisioned.  
Market processes (such as 
risk management, 
regulations, and dispute 
resolution) are critical for 
auction markets  
Bounded rationality of 
charity bidders.  
Difference among investor 
bidders and charity bidders 
is taken into account.  
Outcomes Very high level of 
allocation (93%) and 
relatively medium level of 
interest prices (around 
12.6%).  
Bid is two- dimensional 
(interest, amount).  
High level of currency 
risks not always reflected 
in interest prices.  
Very high level of 
allocation (93%) and 
relatively medium level of 
interest prices (around 
12.6%) has meaning for 
participants  
Intense discussion of high 
levels of Annual 
Percentage Rates (APR)
2
 
and risks shows that 
meaning/rules are 
discussed and 
(re)formulated.  
Very high level of allocation 
(93%) and relatively 
medium level of interest 
prices (around 12.6%).  
Bid is two-dimensional 
(interest, amount).  
Very high APR indicate very 
different stakeholder 
benefits  
Real time information 
updates of bidding event 
outcomes impact investors 
behavior  
Role of 
Technology 
Disclosure of private 
bidding information will 
impact auction outcome.  
Information from 
Information feedback of bidding events and reputation of 
participants (indicated by the level of investors, lenders, 
and providers) is a crucial component.   
Information exchange via forums, blogs, wiki’s, twitter 
                                                 
2
 The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) converts all fees (closing fees as well as interest) associated with a loan, to an interest paid with an annual 
frequency on the decreasing outstanding balance. 
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discussion forum (and 
other outside events) is not 
taken into account to 
impact auction events. 
 
etc. is taken into account.  
 
In brief, these findings from the use of the three theoretical lenses to build a global understanding 
of MYC4 show that each of the research streams has its strengths and weaknesses in terms of 
capturing important aspects of the evolving online auction model in investigation. However, it 
emerged clearly that the first approach – allocation practices – is the one that offers the least help 
in the understanding of MYC4 whereas the second – definitional practices – is the one that 
explains best. However, the third approach –informational practices – seems to have strong 
potential for being more specific in guiding the design and adjustments phases of auction model 
implementation.    
4.2 Using MYC4 to Investigate the Explanatory Power of the Lenses  
In the first part of the analyses, described in the previous section, we used the three theoretical 
lenses to develop an initial understanding of the MYC4 micro-lending platform. In the second 
part of the analysis, presented in this section, we propose to invert the role between empirical 
evidence and theory: we use empirical data gathered from MYC4 to see how much of the case 
each of the theoretical lenses are able to explain (Table 4).  
None of the propositions of the allocation perspective were confirmed. Although the Dutch 
model (the one adopted by MYC4) exhibits some similarities to Vickrey’s model regarding its 
characteristic of stimulating so-called “truth revealing” bidding strategies, we could not confirm 
from the MYC4 data that the choice of that model will generate the best allocative efficiency and 
Pareto optimality. Although the allocation is very high (93% of the loans are funded), it is 
difficult to evaluate if the right bidder is allocated to the right lender for the right price. Similarly, 
we could not confirm that rational bidding leads to the best outcome for individual bidders. On 
the contrary, the motivations for taking part in MYC4 cannot be characterized as purely rational, 
as proposed by theory. Finally, we could not confirm that asymmetric information would have a 
negative impact on the outcome of the auction market. Given investors’ belief in a “cause”, this 
amount of information could be less important compared to other situations.  
Regarding the definitional perspective, our analysis of MYC4 led us to confirm the three 
propositions. First, the online auction market practices of MYC4 are embedded in social 
meanings and generate social meanings. This provides a different regard on this kind of 
phenomenon, leaving behind the assumption of technological determinism where the material 
properties determine the outcomes. From a more constructivist perspective, the meaning attached 
to material artifacts, co-constructed by the social actors, plays an important role. Second, online 
auction markets like MYC4 are evolving practices subject to external factors and internal 
changes. This assertion stimulates openness regarding the changing and adaptable dimension of 
online marketplaces, which is suitable for the specific purpose of micro-lending.  Micro-finance 
is a still evolving area, quite recent, and open to integrating new business models. Seeing 
microlending platforms as evolving practices open to change increases the possibilities of 
unintended adaptations that could improve their chances of success. Third, MYC4 is influenced 
by external practices and in turn influence them. For example, the exchange rates from the 
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European currency (Euro) to local (African) currencies have to strong impact the conversion of 
the loan to local currencies and have an economic impact both to the lender and the borrower. 
Conversion rates are determined outside the MYC4 market. The direct linkages between lenders 
and borrowers are also questioning the role and function of traditional intermediaries in the 
financial industry. So, MYC4 is also influencing the financial industry.  
The three propositions of the informational perspective were also confirmed.  First, the online 
auction market must create value for all the participants involved. The implication of this 
proposition is that, in order to be successful, MYC4 should provide benefits to all stakeholders: 
investors, local providers and lenders, borrowers, and market-makers like the MYC4 
coordinators. In the case of micro-lending platforms, it means that their long-term sustainability 
depends on providing benefits to all, including the target stakeholders in terms of social purposes: 
the borrowers. Second, richer information architecture (with more information feedback over a 
longer period of time) will lead a better auction market outcome. This is also an important aspect, 
because it replaces short-term views of “information asymmetry” assumptions with long-term 
views. In those long-term views, we recall the importance of the feedback provided over a longer 
period of time and the formulation of long-term goals, like contribution to social development 
and achievement of Millennium goals.  Third, online auction markets like MYC4 that are 
designed around human interactions supported by technology in a social context will survive over 
time. Complementary to the two previous propositions, the focus on human interactions 
supported by technology instead of on technological platforms that shape human interactions is of 
crucial importance. The informational perspective provides an opportunity for micro-lending 
platforms to be shaped, adapted and transformed in a way that could provide higher benefits to 
social and economic development of micro-entrepreneurs in developing countries, as is the case 
with MYC4.       
 
Table 4. Validation of the Propositions of Three Theoretical Lenses. 
 
Auction Markets  
as Allocation 
Practices 
Auction Markets  
as Definitional 
Practices 
Auction Markets  
as Informational 
Practices 
Propositions 
derived from 
theories 
P1a: do not confirmed 
P1b: do not confirmed 
P1c: do not confirmed 
P2a: confirmed 
P2b: confirmed 
P2c: confirmed 
P3a: confirmed 
P3b: confirmed 
P3c: confirmed 
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
This article explores a social and economic innovation: an online micro-lending model. At the 
heart of this radical innovation is the online auction model, a concept that has been intensively 
investigated and used in developed countries. However, little knowledge is available about how 
these types of models are used and implemented in emerging economies,  how these types of 
models are used for social purposes like micro-finance and how existing theories can be applied 
to explain such radically innovative phenomena.  
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This article makes two main contributions. First, it applies a synthesis of three theoretical 
approaches to increase our understanding of a particular online auction model in the micro-
lending market – MYC4 – being applied in Africa. Second, we suggest that the adoption of 
sociological and management perspectives, instead of the more often applied economic view, 
could bring a different and relevant understanding to emerging business marketplaces based on 
online action models in a non-Western context.  
Future research could deepen the use of these perspectives in the understanding of similar and 
different types of online auction models, particularly those designed for social purposes, in order 
to consolidate and enrich the findings of our research 
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